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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ALFRED HAYDEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.RUSSELL CEDERLUND,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
7956

BRIEF OF R.ESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Decemher 5, 1949, one Dorn Hayden, son of
appellant, was driving his father's 1942 Dodge ton and
one-half truck east on 33rd South Street (T. 38). The
left front hand window of said truck was knocked half
out and one back window was knocked out (T. 38). The
record indicates that it was the intention of the driver
of this vehicle to turn left on West Temple Street at
33rd South Street (T. 43); that the vehicle's wheels
were cramped to rnake such turn (T. 39); that the driver
alleges he extended his arm, or put his hand out, through
the broken window to indicate his intention to turn left
at a point about a hundred feet, or something like, that,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from the intersection (T. 39); that the truck was traveling about fifteen miles per hour (T. 40); that while the
turn was being negotiated, appellant's truck was struck
in the rear by the vehicle being driven by respondent, in
the left rear corner of the pig tank (T. 40). Dorn
Hayden further testified that: He heard no warning
signal nor siren (T. 39, 54, 60, 61, 62); that he saw no
cars behind him prior to the accident (T. 48, 51); that
he did not see the highway patrol car (the other vehicle
involved in the accident) before the crash (T. 51); that
he did not look in his rear view mirror before attempting
to turn (T. 51).
The respondent, Russell Cederlund, testified that on
the date involved he was in an accident at the site above
referred to (T. 63, 64). That he was driving a 1949 Ford
automobile (T. 63) and that he was proceeding with the
red dome light and the siren on (T. 64). That he observed
no signal whatsoever given by the driver of appellant's
truck ( T. 64) ; that he was proceeding to the scene of an
accident (T. 64); that his vehicle was traveling at a
speed of approximately forty-five or fifty miles per
hour (T. 74); that he had no opportunity to avoid the
accident ( T. 69).
F'actually then, from the record, we have two vehicles
trav~ling in the same direction on a city street. One,
the truck, attempting a left turn at an intersection. The
other, an emergency vehicle, proceeding at a high rate
of speed to the scene of an accident. There is a conflict
in the testimony as to an arm signal and as to whether
or not the emergency vehicle was making use of i tH
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flashing dome light and siren. Driver of appellent's
truck admits. that he observed nothing coming up behind
him and that he did not look to the rear. The trial co-a..rt
refused to direct a verdict but did grant a verdict for
defendant and respondent non obstante veredicto. The
trial court concluded that in view of Section 41-6-69,
U.C.A. 1953, the operator of appellant's truck, for failing to look for traffic approaching from his rear, was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that such
negligence was a pro~imate cause of the collision.
Plaintiff and his son were engaged in a joint enterprise and plaintiff admits that the negligence, if any, of
the driver of the truck may be imputed to plaintiffpassenger.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
NEITHER DIRECTED VERDICTS NOR JUDGMENTS
NON OBSTANTE VERDICTO OFFEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY.

POINT II
THE DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE COLLISION; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
SO HOLDING.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NEITHER DIRECTED VERDICTS NOR JUDGMENTS
NON OBSTANTE VERDICTO OFFEND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY.
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The power of arresting the rendition of judgment
after verdict has always been exercised by the common
law courts of England and, as a general rule, in the
United States as necessarily appurtenant to their control over the causes pending in them. Wentworth v.
Wentworth, ·2 Minn. 277, 72 Am. Dec. 97. However, we
are not unaware of the decisions of this court holding,
prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure of
January 1, 1950, that a motion for judgment notwithstanding-the-verdict was not recognized in this jurisdiction. Kirk v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 143, 89 P. 458;
Yerrick v. District Court, 48 Utah 619, 161 P. 55; and
Morris on v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P. 2d 772. These
cases preceded the adoption of Rules of Civil Procedure
above referred to.
The right to a jury trial according to the rules of the
common law is preserved by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution. It is a well established principle of
the common law that although questions of fact must
be decided by the jury and may not be reexamined by
the court, the question whether there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact to be presented to the
jury is a question of law to be decided by the court. Rule
50, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a procedure for
the determination of this question of law by the courts.
Rule 50 (a) provides for a motion for a directed verdict
at the close of the eviden0e and before the case is subInitted to the jury. It enables the court to determine
whether there is any question of fact to be submitted
to the jury and whether any verdict other than the one

4
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directed would be erroneous as a matter of law. Rule
50 (b) authorizes the court to reserve the decision of
this question of law until after the case has been submitted to the jury. After the court decides that a verdict
should have been directed, it may set aside the verdict
of the jury and enter a judginent notwithstanding-theverdict. We concede that a motion for judgment notwithstanding-th~-verdict cannot be granted unless, as
a matter of law, the opposing party failed to make a case
and a verdict in movant's favor should have been
directed. Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Duncan, Ark.
(1940), 61 S. Ct. 189, -311 U. S. 243, 85 L. Ed. 147.
The court may not weigh the evidence on such a motion ..
George v. Leonard, D.C.S.C. (1949), 84 Fed. Supp. 205.
But, for example, in personal injury actions, if the evidence shows as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's negligence was the cause of his injuries, the defendant is
entitled to a judgment n.o.v. Atlantic Coast LineR·. Co.
v. Mitchell, CCA 5th (1946), 157 F. 2d 880. Before Rule
50 was adopted, January 1, 1950, the law in this state·
was admittedly otherwise.
For further and additional authority, we refer the
Court to the works of Barron and Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Sec. 1071, et seq., Vol. 2.
Appellant's contention that he was denied his right
to a jury trial in violation of the Constitution is without
merit.

;
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POINT II
THE DRIVER OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND
SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE COLLISION; THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
SO HOLDING.

The memorandum decision of the Honorable F. W.
Keller, District Judge·, recites in part:

" * * * The front end of the automobile driven by
the defendant struck the left end of a tank extending across the rear of the truck when the truck
had so far completed the turn that it was approximately three feet from the center line of Thirtythird South Street.

" * * * There was no obstacle between the truck
and the patrol car that would have prevented the
driver of the truck from seeing the patrol car
had he glanced back or looked in a properly
adjusted rear view mirror.
"I am called upon to determine whether the
action of the driver of the truck in making a left
hand turn at the intersection without looking to
ascertain whether the movement could be made
with safety is negligence in law which was a
proximate cause of the collision, • • • The most
pertinent legislative enactm'ent applying to the
question is Section 57-7-133, as amended, U.C.A.
1943 (41-6-69, U.C.A. 1953). The applicable part
of which reads as follows :
"(a)

No person shall turn a vehicle at an
intersection unless the vehicle is in
position upon the roadway as required in Section 57-7-130 (.f 1-6-66 U.

6
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C. A. 1953), or turn a vehicle to enter
a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct
course or move right or left upon a
roadway unless and until such mov-ement can be made with reasonable
safety. No person shall turn any
vehicle without giving an appropriate
signal in the manner hereinafter provided in the event any other traffic
may be affected by such movement."
"The significant portions of the section
quoted are underlined. While it is true that giving
the arm signal indicating a left hand turn may
apprise others on the road of the driver's intention, it is not an act which in any way informs the
driver giving the signal of what the situation is.
I conclude that the language underlined placed
a duty on the driver of the automobile about to
make a left turn to take reasonable measures to
inform himself of the presence of other automobiles. Ordinarily that duty can only be performed
by glancing backward or looking in a rear view
mirror to ascertain if there is traffic approaching
from the rear. The driver of the truck in this
case did not do this and I eonclude that his. failure
was negligence as a matter of law. As heretofore
stated, had he glanced to the rear or looked in his
rear view mirror at any time during the interval
that he says he had his hand extended from the
left window of the car, he would have seen a highway patroll ear proceeding at a speed three times
that at which the truck was traveling and would
have known that he could not, as he did not, make
the left turn without being struck. I therefoi'e conclude that his negligence was a proximate cause

7
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of the collision and resulting injury to the plaintiff."
We respectfully submit that the sole question before
this Court is as to whether or not the violation of the
statute was as a matter of law negligence and that such
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Such
the trial court held and, we are of the opinion, held
correctly. In the case of Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal
Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 502, this court said, in
sustaining the holdings in Smith v. Mine and Smelter
Supply Company, 32 Utah 21, 88 P. 683, and White v.
Shipley, 48 Utah 496, 160 P. 441, 444, quoting from the
latter case;
"When a standard of duty or care is fixed
by law or ordinance, and such law or ordinance
has reference to the safety of life, limb, or prop·erty then, as a matter of necessity, a violation of
such law or ordinance constitutes negligence."
The case of White v. Shipley, supra, was decided by
this court on October 7, 1916 and the court in discussing
the above rule did say:
"We applied that to depositing and maintaining dynamite in a city in violation of an ordinance
(Smith v. Mining, etc Co., 32 Utah 21, 88 Pac.
683), to the operation of a steam railway (Rogers
v. Railroad, 32 Utah 376, 90 Pac. 1075, 125 Am.
st. Rep. 876), and of a street railway (Jens('n 1:.
Utah Light & Ry. Co .. , 42 Utah 415, 132 Pac. 8).
These were all dangerous instrumentalities, the
maintenance or operation of which involved safety
of life, limb and property. But that doctrine has
no application to one merely driving a team or

8
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other vehicle not itself a dangerous instrumentality on the wrong side of a street in vio1ation
of an ordinance. Whether to do so constitutes
negligence is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the case and, generally, is a question of fact and not of law. It, let it be conceded,
ordinarily is evidence of negligence for the consideration of the jury, but cannot as such be
declared by the court as here was done. And then
the charge was here especially erroneous because
of the excavations and torn-up condition of the
street. It may be that in view of all the circumstances, due care, as matter of fact, required the
defendants, as is contended by the respondent, to
have driven around or down the block and then
back on the side of the street where the package
was to be delivered; but the court was not justified in saying that as matter of law. • • • "
(Emphasis added.)
thus declaring that the violation of an Ogden City
ordinance, by the driver of a team and wagon, was not
negligence as a matter of law. In that case the vehicle
was driven down the wrong side of the street in violation of the ordinance and was so driven because there
was an excavation in the center of the street which prevented the driver from crossing from one side to the
other. No such factual situation is presented in the
instant case. We submit that in the case of WhUe v.
Shipley, supra, that had there not been an obstruction
in the center of the roadway that it would most certainly
have been negligence per se to drive a vehicle against
traffic on the wrong side of the street. That point is
not here in issue but is suggested for the purpose of
9
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illustrating the propriety of a directed verdict in situations of the latter nature.
"When Mr. Justice Holmes wrote The Common Law, he prophesied that the time would come
when the jury would never be allowed to decide
the entire fault issue, and would participate in its
determination only when the facts of the defendant's conduct were in doubt; that, in such cases,
the judge would state a specific standard of conduct in his charge, and would instruct the jury
that if the defendant's conduct did not conform to
that standard, the jury should find him guilty of
negligence. Were this the practice, the judge
would have the function of determining the ethical
portion of the fault issue, and the jury's function
would be strictly fact finding. While the prophecy
has not yet come true in general negligence practice, s01nething like the procedure which was
anticipated has been used in negligence per se
cases. In most American jurisdictions it has
usually been said that the violation of a criminal
statute is negligence in itself."
See, The Relation of Criminal Statute and Tort Liability,
46 Harvard Law Review, pages 453 et seq.
We think, in negligence per se cases, that the violation of a criminal statute (or ordinance) is negligence
in law; this court has so held. In the case of North v.
Cartwright, Utah, 229 P. 2d 871, in an unanimous opinion,
the court said with reference to certain statutes under
Title 41, U.C.A. 1953, setting forth traffic rules and
regulations, that:
"These statutes were promulgated for the
protection of the public and to safeguard prop-

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

erty, life and limb of persons using the highways
from accidents of the type here involved. Violations of these statutes then, constitute negligence
in law. This doctrine of the law has be·en steadfastly adhered to by this court and generally in
other courts throughout the United States."
The court went on to cite Skerl v. Willow Creek Coal
Company, 92 Utah 474, 69 P. 2d 502, 506, and White v.
Shipley, supra, and, by implication if nothing more,
abandoned the limitation discussed herein above, placed
on the rnle by the latter case.

In Morby v. Rogers, Utah, 252 P. 2d 231, 235, our
court said:

" * * * the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction (is)
that a law violation is negligence as a matter of
law * * * ."
Citing also North v. Cartwright, supra, but, sustaining
refusal of a directed verdict on other grounds. The·
case of Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Utah, 249 P. 2d 213, reiterates
the rule that the violation of a city ordinance establishes
negligence as a matter of law; reversing, however, the
lower court's order directing a verdict for defendant on
the legal cause problem in negligence per se cases. No
such problem is present in the instant case because "but
for" the turning into the path of the emergency vehicle,
the accident herein occurring and the resultant injuries
therefrom, would have been avoided. That is to say,
the emergency vehi·ele would have in its direct course of
travel safely passed appellant's vehicle.

11
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Appellant cites in support of his Point II:

Martin v. Stevens, Utah, 243 P. 2d 747.
Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., Utah 251 P. 2d 867.
Lloyd v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal. App.) 245 P. 2d
583.
Turner v. McMillan, 140 Ore. 407, 14 P. 2d 294.
Burns v. Standring, et al., 148 Wash. 291, 268 P. 866.
With these authorities we have no quarrel. However,
the rules therein promulgated do not go to the meat of
the matter herein at issue, i.e., the relation of criminal
statutes to tort liability and the question of negligence
per se where the act violating the statute is the proximate
cause of the accident.
CONCLUSION
Concluding, it is the contention of the writer that
Section 41-6-69, U.C.A. 1953, places a burden upon the
operator orf a vehicle not to deviate to right or left from
his course without first ascertaining that he can reasonably do so. The failure to so do is negligence per se and
when such negligence, as in the instant cause, results in
an accident as a proximate cause thereof, recovery is
bared. The evidentiary facts are of such conclusive
character as to require all reasonable minds to conclude
that the ultimate fact of contributory negligence caused
this accident. Where the unconflicting evidence show~.
as here, that the operator of appellant's vehicle exercised no care whatsoever to ascertain whether or not he

12
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could safely negotiate a turn, it became a question of
law whether or not a verdict should be directed non
obstante verdicto. Further, there being nothing in the
record to indicate that the trial court acted arbitrarily
in the matter, the ruling of the lower court should remain
undisturbed.
Du!iflg the year in which our court rendered its
decision in the case of White v. Shipley, supra, i.e., 1916,
there were but thirty-one (31) traffic vehicle fatalities
on the highways of this state. By 1941, the toll had
reached an astounding two hundred and five (205); and,
still steadily increasing, by 195'2, two hundred and fortysix (246). In view of this retrogressive progress, can
it be said that the Legislature, in its wisdom and probable desperation, did not expressly enact this statute in
1941 to safeguard property, life and limb of persons
using our highways from accidents of the type here
involved. We think not.
Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Sound policy lets los·ses
lie where they fall, except where a special reason can
be shown for interference." We submit that when the
court in tort cases adjudges that money is to be given
to a plaintiff, it also adjudges that it is to be taken from
a defendant. The economic security of defendants is
usually as important as the economic security of plaintiffs. Let it be further said that the defendant here was,
in the course of his employment and in the fullfillment
of his duty to the 1notoring public, proceeding to the
scene of another accident which, in all probability, could

13
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have been avoided by a degree of care no greater than
that called for by the statute here invoked.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General
A. ttorneys for Respondent.
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